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First Impressions Matter:











We provide the first direct empirical support for the importance of signalling in mon-
etary policy by testing two key predictions from a novel structural model. First,
all policymaker types should become less tough on inflation over time, and, second,
types that weigh output more should have a more pronounced shift. Voting data
from the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee strongly supports both
predictions. Counterfactual results indicate signalling has a substantial impact on
interest rates over the business cycle, and improves the committee designer’s wel-
fare. Implications for committee design include allowing regular member turnover
and transparency regarding publishing individual votes.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the seminal work of Barro and Gordon (1983a, 1983b), economists have been
aware that, in the absence of commitment devices, central bankers find it difficult to
achieve low inflation due to time consistency problems. As a result, many aspects of
modern monetary policy aim to manage inflation expectations (King, Lu, and Paste´n
2008). Examples include the establishment of independent central banks and recent
forward guidance policies.
A particularly important time for controlling inflation expectations is during the re-
placement of senior policymakers, such as the Chairperson or Governor. In these tran-
sitions, the public naturally speculates about the preferences of incoming policymakers,
about which there is typically substantially more uncertainty than their predecessors’.
For example, Cottle (2012) contemplated how inflation averse incoming Bank of England
Governor Mark Carney would be, and even before Chairman Bernanke announced his
stepping down, The Economist (2013) and Appelbaum (2013) speculated about who,
and how inflation averse, his replacement would be.
An idea with a long history in monetary policy is that new policymakers can take
advantage of the uncertainty surrounding their preferences to signal inflation aversion to
the public, thereby anchoring future expectations.1 A central prediction of this literature
is that policymakers act aggressively against inflation early in their careers but then
adopt looser policies over time. This idea is also important in practice with Flanders
(2011), for example, suggesting that Mario Draghi would go out of his way to rebut
national stereotypes by being especially tough on inflation immediately following his
appointment, and refrain from adopting unconventional, expansionary policies used by
other central banks.2
Despite the importance of the signalling idea, there is surprisingly little evidence in the
literature assessing whether it affects actual policy choices.3 The primary contribution
of this paper is to provide evidence from a structural model that strongly supports the
relevance of signalling for individual voting behavior on the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC), and to quantify its impact on policy outcomes and welfare.
To begin, we construct a model that captures the important details of the monetary
1Papers in this tradition include Backus and Driffill (1985a, 1985b), Barro (1986), Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986), Vickers (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001), Sibert (2002, 2003, 2009) and King, Lu, and
Paste´n (2008). This literature built on Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
2She writes “If you’re sitting in Spain and Portugal, you might well wonder whether you would have
been better off with a German in charge, trying to show off his inner Italian—than an Italian desperate
to prove he’s German underneath.”
3There is a literature in which agents in the economy learn about policy behavior, but the central
bank is not strategic in choosing policy to take advantage of this learning. Bianchi and Melosi (2012)
and Erceg and Levin (2003) are examples. In signalling models, central bankers react strategically to
the public’s learning to affect inflation expectations, and their policy stance is determined endogenously.
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policy decision-making process. Members serve for a finite time on an infinitely-lived
committee that sets policy. In each period, the economy is in one of two states, an infla-
tionary state which requires a high rate, or a non-inflationary state which requires a low
rate. Members receive common information about the economy, representing economic
data and staff forecasts, which they combine with heterogeneous private assessments to
form beliefs on the state. Preferences are standard; all policymakers dislike deviations of
inflation from a target rate, but differ in the weights they put on the output gap. We
refer to these weights as preference types. A type who puts more (less) weight on output
is inflation tolerant (averse).4
The model gives rise to cutoff voting rules in which all members vote for high rates
when there is sufficient evidence the state is high. The level of evidence a member requires
is called her cutoff. Members who place a higher weight on the output gap use a higher
cutoff and so, ceteris paribus, vote low more often. Equilibrium multiplicity in models
of signalling in monetary policy is generally problematic (Persson and Tabellini 2000,
p. 407), and even more so for empirical work. Importantly, our model yields unique
equilibrium dynamics.5 Since more inflation-averse members vote high more often in
all periods, whenever the public observes a high vote by rookie members they reduce
future inflation expectations. This gives every member, regardless of type, an additional
incentive to vote for high rates when a rookie. This incentive is absent when a veteran,
and therefore yields the first empirical prediction that all policymakers’ cutoffs increase
with tenure.
While the overall message of declining toughness on inflation with tenure is present
in the existing literature, the model also yields a second, more novel prediction. The
extent to which members care about reducing future inflation expectations relates to the
weight they put on the output gap.6 So, the incentive to use a higher cutoff early in
one’s tenure is increasing in type, yielding the difference-in-differences prediction that
the magnitude of the increase in a banker’s cutoff is increasing in her type. These two
4Each of the N committee members draws one of K types, and all members behave strategically,
whereas in the previous theoretical literature on signalling in monetary policy committees (Sibert 2003)
there are two members with one of two types, a mechanistic hawk that always votes for zero inflation
and a strategic dove that tries to build a reputation.
5In pure signalling models (Backus and Driffill 1985a,b, Vickers 1986, Sibert 2002), there are at least
as many levels of inflation as there are preference types, so policy choices can perfectly reveal the banker’s
types. These models typically admit both separating and pooling equilibria. Papers such as Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001), and Sibert (2009) address this problem by introducing
exogenous noise in the mapping between the ploicymakers’ intended policy and the actual policy. By
contrast, in our model, all types have a positive probability of choosing high and low rates in every
period, but different types differ in these probabilities.
6Papers in the career concerns literature such as Levy (2007) and Visser and Swank (2007) study
voting on committees when members care about their reputation in addition to policy. But, whereas
career concerns models assume policymakers place some exogenous weight on their reputation, in this
paper (and in those cited above) reputation concerns emerge endogenously in equilibrium due to the
structure of the macroeconomy.
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predictions together form a counterpoint to the view of Flanders (2011) quoted above.
While it is true that members who are more inherently inflation tolerant (“Italians”) will
signal more than the inherently inflation averse (“Germans”), we predict that both types
will act tougher against inflation early in their tenures than later to establish a reputation
for toughness.
The empirical analysis begins by describing reduced-form evidence broadly consistent
with the model. In line with the first prediction, members are significantly less likely to
vote for high interest rates after serving an initial period on the MPC. This is in line
with a similar finding in Hansen and McMahon (2008), and also with Gerlach-Kristen
(2003), who notes that MPC members seem less likely to dissent with time based on
vote tabulations. Moreover, using two measures of preference type, we also find evidence
that more inflation-tolerant members have a higher fall in the probability of voting high.
The only other paper that examines voting dynamics on the MPC is Berk, Bierut, and
Meade (2010).7 They estimate interest rate rules for internal and external members on
the MPC and find that internal members become relatively more hawkish. This finding
is consistent with our difference-in-differences prediction given that internals tend to be
less inflation tolerant than external members.
Although none of these papers claim to provide a test of signalling, we argue that
their evidence cannot be interpreted as such because they do not control for changes in
the parameters that determine beliefs on the state—the common prior and the precision
of private assessments—in order to pin down the evolution of the cutoff—the parameter
that signalling affects. We instead use a structural estimator that separately estimates
all these theoretical objects, allowing us to verify the two main dynamic predictions of
the model. First, the average veteran member on the MPC uses a significantly higher
cutoff than the average rookie member. Second, we show that this increase in the cutoff
is significantly higher for more inflation-tolerant MPC members. To the best of our
knowledge, these results represent the first empirical validation of models of signalling in
monetary policy.
Our final contribution is to examine the extent to which rookies’ signalling actually
translates into the committee’s choosing higher rates, and how this impacts welfare, by
comparing simulated interest rate paths chosen by a signalling committee with those
chosen by a non-signalling committee. We find that signalling induces at least a 25bps
higher interest rate after a five-year business cycle with probability 0.93, while over the
same period the likelihood that the signalling path is at least 50bps higher is 0.74. For a
7There are a number of other papers using MPC voting data that focus on static voting differences,
in particular those between internal and external members (Gerlach-Kristen 2004, Bhattacharjee and
Holly 2005, Spencer 2006, Besley, Meads, and Surico 2008, Harris and Spencer 2008, Hix, Hoyland, and
Vivyan 2010, Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco 2014). All are reduced form with the exception of Hansen,
McMahon, and Velasco (2014), who use a different estimator than the one we use in the main text.
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social planner who weighs all mistakes equally, the overall effect of signalling is to improve
welfare; while over five years the signalling committee would, on average, make 4.0 errors,
a non-signalling committee would make 6.3. These results have a number of implications
for committee design with the most obvious two being that there should be a reasonable
amount of committee member turnover (rather than having members serve for too long)
and that the committee environment should be transparent given that the public’s being
able to directly observe individual votes facilitates signalling.
The fundamental take-away of the paper is to show that reputation effects on inde-
pendent monetary policy committees should be treated as of first-order importance. A
large literature, summarized in Drazen (2001), highlights the difficulties that politicians
have in establishing credible monetary policy, and the establishment of independent com-
mittees was a direct response to this insight. While we agree that this no doubt eased
inflationary traps, our paper shows committees cannot be viewed as simply replicating
the policies of the metaphorical “hard-nosed” central banker often invoked to discuss the
behavior of central banks. Instead, our estimates imply that a model in which preferences
are heterogenous and establishing credibility is crucial fits voting data very well in an
institutional context admired for its independence.
Beyond the particular application of our model to the MPC, we view our framework
as a natural one for quantitatively assessing the impact of signalling on voting dynamics.
It could, for instance, be directly applied to voting data on other committees. Outside
monetary policy, the mechanism we identify should be relevant in any context in which
the policymaker’s desired outcomes depend on the public’s expectations about her ac-
tions. For example, several countries are currently establishing new macro prudential
and regulatory bodies following the financial crisis. As the willingness of banks to engage
in risky practices presumably depends on their beliefs that authorities will punish such
behavior, regulators can signal their intention to crack down on these practices by taking
tough stances at the beginning of their careers. This would discourage banks from fu-
ture bad behavior, meaning regulators can achieve their policy objectives without further
actions later in their tenures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out a theory of signalling. Section 3
explains the institutional setting of the MPC and the data we use. Section 4 presents
reduced-form evidence on dynamics, before we turn to a structural analysis in section
5. Section 6 examines the robustness of the empirical results. Section 7 then uses the
estimated structural parameters to quantify the impact of signalling on policy choices
and welfare. Section 8 concludes.
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2 A Model of Reputation and Policy Dynamics
A monetary policy committee of N (odd) policymakers chooses either a higher or lower
interest rate rt ∈ {0, 1} in each of t = 1, . . . ,∞ periods.8 Members serve for two periods
with staggered appointments, and in odd (even) periods there are N1 (N0) new members.
A member in his first period is a rookie and in his second a veteran. Each member i in
period t chooses a vote vit ∈ {0, 1}, with rt chosen by majority rule.
In each period, an inflationary state variable ωt ∈ {0, 1} is realized, with ωt = 1 indi-
cating a more inflationary state. The state is drawn according to Pr [ωt = 1 ] = qt ∈ (0, 1),
where qt is independent and identically distributed across periods with mean q. Period t
inflation pit ∈ R depends both on rt and ωt through the relationship pit = pi(rt, ωt). Higher
interest rates lower inflation for a given state of the economy, i.e. pi(1, ωt) < pi(0, ωt) ∀ωt,
and a more inflationary state leads to higher inflation, i.e. pi(rt, 1) > pi(rt, 0) ∀rt.
All central bankers discount the future by a factor δ, and member preferences within
period t are given by
uit = u (rt, ωt, θi) = −l(pit) + θi(pit − piEt ), (1)
where l captures losses from deviations of inflation from its target level, and pit − piEt
captures the gains from a positive output gap which is expressed using surprise inflation
(as follows from an expectations-augmented Phillips Curve). A banker’s type θi is the
weight put on the output gap and hence a measure of inflation tolerance; θi = 0 is an
“inflation nutter” who only cares about inflation deviations (King 1997). θi is drawn
independently from a prior distribution p0 defined on Θ, a finite set with K non-negative
elements and maximum value θ. Below we consider the cases in which θi is both public
and private information. Period t inflation expectations piEt are the beliefs the public
holds at time t on current inflation. In line with the literature, we consider the public to
be a single, representative player and solve endogenously for piEt .
To ensure members do not trivially vote for either high (vit = 1) or low (vit = 0)
interest rates in every period, members need to have a strict preference for matching the
decision rt to the state ωt. Let µωt ≡ l [pi(1− ωt, ωt)]− l [pi(ωt, ωt)] be the net welfare loss
of inflation from failing to match the decision to the state. The following assumptions
are sufficient for ensuring this property:
A1 µωt > 0 for ωt = 0, 1
8The interest rates that form the binary agenda can change from meeting to meeting, and the higher
of the two under consideration refers to the rt = 1 policy choice. For example, in a meeting in which
policymakers decide between not changing interest rates and raising by 25 basis points, rt = 1 corresponds
to raising rates. On other hand, in a meeting in which policymakers decide between cutting interest rates
by 25 basis points and not changing interest rates, rt = 1 corresponds to not changing.
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A2 µ1 − θ [pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1)] > 0







A1 implies rt = ωt minimizes l(pit). A2 implies even the most inflation-tolerant type
prefers rt = 1 in state ωt = 1. A3 ensures that any effect of rt on period t+1 expectations
is never strong enough to overturn the motivation to match the policy to the state.9
Before voting, each member observes the (conditionally independent) private signal
sit ∼ N (ωt, σ2it), where σit = σR (σit = σV ) if i is a rookie (veteran) in period t.10 We refer
to σ as expertise since it measures the ability to perceive economic conditions. Allowing
σ to evolve with time is important since, for example, members might become better
able to observe economic conditions with experience. After observing sit, member i uses
Bayes’ rule to update his belief on the state to ω̂it ≡ Pr [ωt = 1 | sit ]. The timing of each
period t subgame is the following.
1. Rookie members join the committee, and each one draws a preference type θi.
2. qt is observed by all players.
3. ωt is drawn but not observed by any player.
4. The public forms piEt .
5. All committee members observe their private signals.
6. Committee members simultaneously choose votes, which all players observe.
7. pit is observed by all players (which implicitly reveals ωt).
2.1 Equilibrium concept
Let pit be the reputation of member i at time t. This is the belief that i’s colleagues
and the public hold on his preference type θi. All rookies’ reputation is the prior p0,
while veterans’ reputations depend on their votes as rookies. Denote by pt the vector
of reputations associated with members of the period t committee, and let NRt be the
number of period t rookies. We limit attention to symmetric Markov strategies with
respect to It = (pt, qt, N
R
t ). Rookies use strategy vR : θi, sit, It → {0, 1} and veterans use
strategy vV : θi, sit, It → {0, 1}.11
9This is proved in appendix A.2.
10The key property of normality is the monotone likelihood ratio. The theoretical results are robust
to conditional signal distributions of the form g(s | ωt) defined over the support (s, s) so long as g(s|1)g(s|0) is
continuous and strictly increasing in s, with unbounded limits as s approaches s and s.
11The restriction to pure strategies is innocuous. If one admitted mixed strategies, committee members
would be indifferent between voting high and low only for a measure-0 set of signals.
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The theory literature considers both sincere and strategic behavior in static voting
games with private information (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996). Voters behave sincerely
when they maximize their expected utility conditional on their signals. This is in contrast
to strategic voting, in which voters additionally condition on actually being pivotal. Here
we apply a concept similar to sincere voting by assuming that equilibrium strategies
maximize expected utility given signals and given how the public forms period t inflation
expectations piEt , which we denote by the mapping pi
E : It → R. In words, piEt is formed
by taking the period t committee member’s reputations pt, the distribution over states
qt, and the committee composition N
R
t , and using them to forecast pit. In equilibrium
this forecast must be consistent with voting strategies, as the following formalizes. (As
we discuss below, we consider the case of strategic voting in an online appendix and the
main messages of the paper are unchanged.)
Definition 1 A Sincere Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is a pair of strategies
(v∗R, v
∗
V ) and expectation formation rule pi
E∗ where:
1. v∗V = arg max
vit∈{0,1}
E[u (vit, ωt, θi) | sit, It ] given piE∗.
2. v∗R = arg max
vit∈{0,1}
E[u (vit, ωt, θi) + δu (v
∗
V , ωt+1, θi) | sit, It ] given piE∗.
3. piE∗ satisfies Bayes’ rule given v∗R and v
∗
V .
When θi is private information, equilibrium inflation expectations are formed in the
following way. First, the public uses the period t− 1 observed votes of rookies to update
its beliefs on their preference types, which go into pt. Second, given It and the equilib-
rium voting strategies, the public computes the probability of rt = 1. Third, given the
relationship pit = pi(rt, ωt), the public computes the expected value of pit. Hence there is
a link between observed votes and piEt , which gives rise to the signalling channel.
2.2 Equilibrium policy dynamics
To begin the discussion of the solution, we follow Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and
define cutoff voting rules for member i in meeting t as those in which he chooses vit = 1 if
and only if ω̂it
1−ω̂it ≥ Cit ∈ (0,∞), where Cit is i’s period t cutoff. The cutoff measures the
amount of evidence for the inflationary state (ωt = 1) that is required in order to vote
high. Loosely speaking, the cutoff captures the inclination to choose lower interest rates
in a given meeting and so it can be related to the common classification of policymakers
into “hawks” and “doves”. A voter with Cit = 1 is neutral in the sense of voting in
the direction of whichever state is most likely. Members with Cit < 1 are then hawkish
as they require weaker evidence of an inflationary state to vote for high rates, and, by
similar logic, members with Cit > 1 are dovish.
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≡ s∗it (Cit, σit, qt) . (2)
In other words, a high vote is chosen if the signal reaches a critical threshold s∗it. A
feature of cutoff voting rules is that observing vit never allows the public to perfectly
infer θi because even though different types have different probabilities of choosing high
rates, votes also depend on the realization of private signals. Nonetheless, the empirical
consequences of a change in the cutoff is clear: when Cit increases, the probability of
voting high decreases since the threshold the signal must reach increases.
2.2.1 Policymaking with no signalling
We first consider a game in which θi is public information. This is a useful benchmark
because its equilibrium is equivalent to one of a game in which inflation expectations
do not react to observed votes, and the motive to use one’s vote to signal one’s type is
absent (NS = no signalling). We will use this benchmark in the counterfactual analysis
in section 7.
Proposition 1 With known θi, there is a unique equilibrium in which rookies and vet-
erans use cutoff voting rules with cutoff
CNS(θi) =
µ0 + θi [pi(0, 0)− pi(1, 0)]
µ1 − θi [pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1)] . (3)
The voting rule in (3) derives from members’ expected utility maximization problem
treating piEt as fixed. The numerator is the cost of a wrong decision in state 0 (the utility
that is lost from choosing vit = 1 if the realized state is 0), while the denominator is
the benefit of a correct decision in state 1. A banker who puts more weight on output
has a higher cost in state 0 since vit = 1 implies lower output, and similarly a lower
benefit in state 1. This means that he adopts a higher cutoff, and votes high less often.
Of course, in equilibrium inflation expectations piEt are not fixed but consistent with
bankers’ strategies given by (3). When the public knows that a member has a higher θi,
it increases its inflation expectations in line with the higher cutoff.12
12One can show that bankers with θi > 0 would like to commit to using a voting rule with a lower
cutoff than the one used in equilibrium (proof available on request), and internalize the effect of the
cutoff on piEt . In this sense, types that put positive weight on the output gap over-inflate the economy
as in the Barro and Gordon model.
8
2.2.2 Policymaking with signalling
We now turn to the more realistic case in which θi is private information. Inflation
expectations now react to observed votes, and the signalling channel is present.
Proposition 2 With unknown θi, in all equilibria rookies and veterans use cutoff voting






and CSV (θi), respectively, where








is strictly increasing in θi.






> 0 ∀θi, qt, NRt .






is strictly increasing in θi ∀qt, NRt .
While equilibria may not be unique, all share the same qualitative features. First, veterans
use the same cutoff as when their preferences are observed. Second, equilibrium cutoffs
for both rookies and veterans increase in θi. Third, all types use a higher cutoff in
the second period than the first. Finally, the difference in cutoffs between veterans and
rookies is increasing in θi. Figure 1 illustrates the predicted dynamics in the cutoff for
three different preference types ordered by inflation tolerance (θ3 places the highest weight
on output deviations and so is most tolerant of inflation; θ1 places the lowest weight on
output deviations and is least tolerant) with and without signalling incentives.
Rookie cutoffs Veteran cutoffs
C (θ1) C (θ1)
C (θ2) C (θ2)
C (θ3) C (θ3)
(a) No signalling








Figure 1: Predicted Dynamics in Equilibrium Cutoffs for Types θ1 < θ2 < θ3.
Notes: This figure shows how the equilibrium cutoff evolves for three representative prefer-
ence types θ1, θ2, and θ3 between their first and second periods on the committee. All types
use the same cutoff when veterans whether or not types are public or private information.
When types are known, each adopts the same cutoff when a rookie as when a veteran.
When types are unknown, each adopts a lower cutoff when a rookie, with the extent of the
difference with the veteran cutoff increasing in type.
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To understand this result, it is first useful to understand in more detail how committee
members’ reputations pt are formed. All period t rookies share the same reputation p0,
while every period t veteran has one of two reputations depending on whether he voted
high or low as a rookie in period t − 1. (Recall that rookies use symmetric strategies).
How high and low votes change a voter’s reputation depends on qt−1 and NRt−1, which
directly enter equilibrium strategies, and also ωt−1, which is observed prior to period t
and determines the probability of voting high given a threshold s∗i,t−1. So, without loss
of generality, one can express pt = p
(




where V Rt−1 is the number of
rookies who vote high in period t− 1.
In terms of equilibrium behavior, veterans in period t have the same utility maxi-
mization problem as when preferences are public information; they treat piEt as fixed, and
their votes do not change future expectations. So in equilibrium they use the same cutoff
as without signalling. On the other hand, rookies in period t must consider the effect of
their vote on piEt+1, which we define as
∆(qt, N
R





























where V R−i,t is the number of high rookie votes excluding rookie i’s. In words, ∆(qt, N
R
t |
ωt) is the expected change in future inflation expectations from voting low rather than
high given current economic conditions.13






[pi(0, 0)− pi(1, 0)]− δ∆(qt, NRt | 0)
}
µ1 − θi {[pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1)]− δ∆(qt, NRt | 1)}
. (5)
The key step in the proof is to show that the equilibrium sign of ∆ must always be
positive. The logic follows three steps. First, since veterans’ cutoff is strictly increasing
in θi, the public increases inflation expectations when it believes more inflation-tolerant
veterans set policy. Second, given that (5) is increasing in θi (for any values of ∆, in or
out of equilibrium), in every equilibrium it must be the case that more inflation-tolerant
rookies are more likely to choose vit = 0. Finally, combining these two observations means
that when the public observes vit = 0, it associates the rookie with a more inflation-
tolerant type, which leads it to increase piEt+1. In short, all preference types have an
additional incentive in the first period to vote for high rates that is absent in the second:
doing so allows them to build a reputation for inflation aversion that anchors future
inflation expectations at a lower level.
13The expectation is taken with respect to qt+1, as well as the types of other rookies and the signals
they draw, which, along with knowledge of the cutoffs they use, determines V R−i,t.
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The model predicts that the increase in cutoff is greater the more inflation tolerant
the type because the signalling incentive in (5) is directly linked to the weight the banker
places on the future output gap. More inflation-tolerant types have a higher weight on
this, and so, intuitively, care more about convincing the market they are inflation averse
than inherently inflation-averse types do. This gives rise to the difference-in-differences
on the evolution of the cutoff.
2.3 Discussion of modelling assumptions
The model abstracts from details such as the transmission from the interest rate to
inflation in order to explicitly model the individual decisions of MPC members, and to set
up a tight link between the theory and subsequent empirical exercise. While embedding
it into a richer macroeconomic setting would be an important next step, the model as it
stands provides a baseline framework through which to assess the importance of signalling
in monetary policy. We now address some of its specific simplifications.
Three potentially restrictive assumptions are that we assume (i) members vote sin-
cerely, (ii) members are ex-ante identical, and (iii) members have no career concerns. We
shall address each of these limitations but we defer their discussion until section 6, after
the empirical analysis of behavior, so that we can empirically explore the implications of
alternative modelling assumptions.
Another feature of the model is that members serve for two periods. In the first section
of the online appendix we explore a T -period signalling model. While this introduces
additional effects of changes in reputation, the solution features the same qualitative
dynamics between any two periods t and t+ 1 as in the two period model: all types use
a higher cutoff over time, with a more pronounced evolution for higher types.
In assuming linearity of preferences in the output gap, we follow much of the previous
literature (Backus and Driffill 1985a,b, Cukierman and Meltzer 1986, Vickers 1986, Sibert
2002, 2003, 2009). A primary advantage of this is that cutoffs are independent of current
inflation expectations. Otherwise, changes in future inflation expectations from current
votes would also change future voting behavior via changes in cutoffs.
Next, as is typically the case in the literature, policymakers in our model wish to
anchor inflation expectations against a tendency to rise. In an alternative model, such
as a liquidity trap model, policymakers may wish to raise inflation expectations. While
such cases do not apply to the sample period we consider, in such circumstances a similar
signalling channel would predict a tendency towards higher cutoffs early in tenure.
Finally, we assume that members care only about inflation expectations when they
serve on the committee, whereas one might imagine utility would depend on the present
discounted value of all future periods’ inflation expectations. Our formulation is without
11
loss of generality in the sense that we only write utility as a function of the variables that
members’ votes affect in equilibrium. For example, while period t veterans might care
about piEt+1, its equilibrium value is independent of their period t votes since their types
do not impact rt+1. In section 6 we explore the alternative assumption that members
care about the committee’s reputation independently of their own.
3 The Bank of England MPC as a Test of the Model
The theoretical model has two key empirical predictions corresponding to the third and
fourth properties, respectively, described in proposition 2. The first (empirical prediction
1) is that members increase their cutoffs as they transition from rookies to veterans. The
second (empirical prediction 2) is that more inflation-tolerant members—those a higher
θ—increase their cutoffs by more than more inflation-averse members. We now proceed
to test the model using voting data from the Bank of England’s MPC. This section
provides the necessary background details and data sources, while the next two present
reduced-form and structural evidence in support of the signalling model.
3.1 Institutional Background
The MPC has met once a month since June 1997 to set UK interest rates. It has nine
standing members (five Bank executives, or internal members, and four external mem-
bers) who are required to vote independently.14 The standard term of office during our
sample, apart from for the Governor and the two Deputy Governors, is three years (36
meetings); Governor-level positions carry five year terms. The Act that created the MPC
allows for the reappointment of all members, internal and external. The average served
by members in our sample is 46 meetings; only former Governor Mervyn King is present
in all 142 of our sample meetings.
Within the monthly meeting, and after a general discussion of economic and business
trends, each member summarizes his or her view to the rest of the MPC and suggests
which vote they favor (although, as Lambert (2006) notes, they can, if they wish, wait
to hear others’ views before committing to a vote). This process begins with the Deputy
Governor for monetary policy and concludes with the Governor, but the order for the
14According to the Bank of England (2010a)
Each member of the MPC has expertise in the field of economics and monetary policy.
Members are not chosen to represent individual groups or areas. They are independent.
Each member of the Committee has a vote to set interest rates at the level they believe is
consistent with meeting the inflation target. The MPC’s decision is made on the basis of
one-person, one vote. It is not based on a consensus of opinion. It reflects the votes of each
individual member of the Committee.
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others is not fixed. To formally conclude the meeting, the Governor proposes an interest
rate decision that he believes will command a majority. Each member then chooses
whether to agree with the Governor’s proposal, or dissent and state an alternative interest
rate. Plurality rule determines the interest rate, with the Governor deciding in the case
of a tie. Disagreements between members are the rule rather than the exception: 64% of
the meetings in the sample have at least one deviation from the committee majority and
there are many meetings decided by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3.
The MPC’s remit, as defined in the Bank of England Act (1998) is to “maintain price
stability, and subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s govern-
ment, including its objectives for growth and employment.” In practice, the committee
seeks to achieve a target inflation rate of 2%, based on the Consumer Price Index. If
inflation is greater than 3% or less than 1%, the Governor of the Bank of England must
write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why. Upside and downside misses are
treated equally seriously.15
3.2 Data
The paper analyzes the MPC voting record through March 2009, when the interest rate
reached its effective zero lower bound and a period of quantitative easing (QE) began;
from then, the main MPC decision concerned how many assets to purchase. We use
each regular MPC meeting in this period but drop from the dataset the (unanimous)
emergency meeting held after 9/11. This sample yields a total of 142 meetings, and 1246
individual votes (all these data are available from Bank of England (2010b)).
The four main empirical counterparts to the theoretical objects from the model re-
quired for estimation are the binary voting agenda, proxies for the prior qt, and, for each
member, classification as rookie or veteran, and measures of the preference type θ. The
first two of these are described in detail in Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco (2014) (and
its online appendix), so here we provide only a brief description. Descriptive statistics of
the final two covariates are in the appendix (table B.1).
In meetings with two observed votes, we set vit = 1 if member i votes for the higher
one. In meetings with one observed vote, we use a Reuters survey of City of London
financial institutions conducted prior to each MPC meeting in which respondents are
asked to submit a probability distribution over outcomes. We take the second alternative
in the meeting to be the one that receives the highest average weight in the survey (the
observed vote is always one of the two outcomes given highest average weight).16
15“The remit is not to achieve the lowest possible inflation rate. Inflation below the target of 2% is
judged to be just as bad as inflation above the target. The inflation target is therefore symmetrical”
Bank of England (2015).
16In the seven meetings with three unique votes, we identify the two most likely choices to make up
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The first proxy for the prior—denoted qRt —uses the Reuter’s survey and is the average
probability placed on the higher of the two outcomes on the agenda over the average
probability of observing either outcome on the agenda. The second—denoted qMt —relies
on backing out the probabilities of different outcomes using the price distributions of
LIBOR futures described in Bank of England (2011). It is again the average probability
placed on the higher agenda outcome over the probabilities of either agenda outcome.17
To classify members as rookies and veterans we use the indicator variable
D(Vet)it =
0 if member i has served in 18 or fewer meetings1 if member i has served in more than 18 meetings (6)
where 18 meetings represents half the median term length. Below we explore the effect
of using different splits by committee tenure.
We classify member types using two different but related measures (and explore ro-
bustness to other measures in section 6). While θi is by definition private information
for member i, individual voting histories provide information that allows the public and
econometrician to update their beliefs—in every period members with a higher θi are
more likely to choose vit = 0. Our approach assigns members to an inflation-averse or
inflation-tolerant group based on the percentage of votes cast that are high.18 In the
model all preference types adopt relatively similar cutoffs when rookies, which suggests
veteran votes are more informative for inferring preference types. Therefore, our first
measure D(θPCTExp)i splits the sample of members evenly based on the percentage of
total votes cast that are high while a veteran. D(θPCTExp)i = 1 (= 0) denotes a more
inflation-averse (inflation-tolerant) member. However, as five of the 27 members in the
sample never served as veterans, this measure has some missing values. Moreover, rookie
votes might actually be more informative than veteran votes if expertise increases with
time, although our empirical results below show this is not the case. We therefore define
our second measure D(θPCT ) as the percentage of all votes cast by member i that are
high. Table B.1 shows member classification for both proxies.
the binary agenda, then pool the votes for the third option into the nearest option that is part of the
binary agenda. See online appendix E of Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco (2014) for full details.
17For five meetings the Reuter’s survey and price distributions are not available, so when using esti-
mators that rely on qRt and q
M
t the sample size is 1201 rather than 1246.
18The difference-in-differences prediction depends on the true type θ not the public’s belief on θ at
time t. We can therefore use the entire voting history to proxy θ, and apply it to all voting periods even
though the public has not yet seen all the votes that go into constructing the proxy.
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4 Reduced-Form Evidence
We begin the analysis of voting dynamics with reduced-form evidence by estimating a
linear probability model on the binary vote variable:
vit = µi + δt + λ0D(Vet)it + it, (7)
where µi is a member fixed effect, δt is a time fixed effect that captures the average vote
in meeting t, and it is an error term. The results are reported in column (1) of table 1,
and show that veteran members are significantly less likely to vote for high rates than
rookies, with a gap of 9.2 percentage points. The inclusion of member and time effects
indicates this change is driven by some systematic shift at the individual level rather
than, for example, changing economic conditions.
Column (2) of table 1 reports estimates of a regression that replaces D(Vet)it with
separate indicators for having served on the MPC more than twelve, 24, and 36 months.
The main finding is that after members have served in their first twelve months, they are
significantly less likely to choose high rates, but there is no significant additional change
in voting probabilities as members serve longer and longer.19 Finally, column (3) reports
results from replacing D(Vet)it with an indicator for whether a member is within nine
months of the end of a given (renewable) term of office. Being near the end of a term
has no effect on the probability the average member chooses high rates, indicating that
the effect of being a veteran is not driven by approaching the end of one’s current term.
The fact that the probability of voting high declines after some time on the MPC is
consistent with members’ cutoffs increasing over time (empirical prediction 1). To test
empirical prediction 2, that there is a difference-in-differences between high and low types
in the change in the cutoff, we estimate the following relationship:
vit = µi + δt + λ0D(Vet)it + λ1D(θ
X)i ×D(Vet)it + it (8)
where D(θX)i is either of the two measures of type discussed above. Columns (4) and
(5) present estimates for both measures. In each case, there is a significant difference-
in-differences (the inflation tolerant have a higher fall in the probability of choosing high
rates), but the fall in the probability for more inflation-averse members is not significant.
19This is consistent with the T -period model we solve in the online appendix in which the signalling
effect is strongest in initial periods before declining steadily over time.
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Table 1: Reduced-form evidence on the impact of experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Main Regressors vit vit vit vit vit










D(θPCTExp) x D(Vet) -0.13***
[0.003]
D(θPCT ) x D(Vet) -0.080*
[0.055]
Constant 0.98*** 0.97*** 1.01*** 1.22*** 0.95***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-squared 0.704 0.703 0.701 0.707 0.705
Model Panel LPM Panel LPM Panel LPM Panel LPM Panel LPM
Member effects? YES YES YES YES YES
Time effects? YES YES YES YES YES
Sample? 06/97-03/09 06/97-03/09 06/97-03/09 06/97-03/09 06/97-03/09
Obs? 1246 1246 1246 1204 1246
Notes: This regression presents OLS estimates of equation (7) with standard errors clus-
tered by member. The dependent variable, vit, is our measure of whether member i votes
for the high interest rate in period t.
5 Structural Estimation
One reason against interpreting the reduced-form evidence as a strict test of the signalling
model (and why one should not jump to any positive or negative conclusions based on
the results) is that it concerns changes in voting probabilities, whereas the theoretical
predictions concern changes in the cutoff C, only one component of the voting probability.
For example, if σ is constant over a member’s tenure, a rise in C unambiguously lowers
the probability of voting high. However, if σ changes over time, one cannot interpret a
fall in the probability as incontrovertible evidence of C’s rising. To demonstrate this,
we examine theoretically how voting probabilities change when members gain expertise
with tenure without changing their cutoff. Suppose the average committee member is a
hawk, with C = 0.4, and suppose that members gain expertise over time, with σ = 0.7
for rookies and σ = 0.3 for veterans. Figure 2a plots the theoretical difference in the
probability of voting high between veterans and rookies as a function of qt. For most
values, the difference is negative, and the average value is around −0.09, the measured
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probability change in column (1) of table 1. The intuition for why greater expertise
generates a decline in the probability of voting high is that, since all members want to
get the correct decision (rt = ωt), a more expert (veteran) member who sees the true
state of the economy more clearly will tend to vote with the state and is less affected by
his cutoff. That the cutoff has less (more) influence on the decision of a member with a
low (high) σ is shown formally in equation (2) where σit directly interacts with Cit. So,
in this example, the rookie will be more inclined to vote for high rates than the veteran
even though the cutoff does not change.













C=0.4, σ=0.7 → 0.3
(a) Change in Pr [ vit = 1 ] with increasing expertise.













Dove (dashed): C=1.1 → 4.0, σ=0.5
Hawk (solid): C=0.15 → 0.55, σ=0.5
(b) Change in Pr [ vit = 1 ] for a hawk and a dove.
Figure 2: Change in probability of voting high when different characteristics change.
Notes: These figures show the theoretical difference between veteran and rookie members
in the probability of voting for the high interest rate as a function of qt. In the left panel,
the expertise of the individual is increased (σ falls from 0.7 to 0.3). The right panel shows
how the probabilty of voting high will be affected if an initial hawk (dove) becomes more
dovish.
Even if σ were constant over time, using reduced-form estimates to test the difference-
in-differences prediction would be difficult. The mapping from changes in C to changes
in the probability of voting high is non-linear and depends on how extreme preferences
are. For example, if the change in C moves a hawk from being very hawkish to slightly
hawkish, it will have a bigger effect than a shift that moves a dove from being close to
neutral, to slightly dovish. Figure 2b illustrates this problem. We assume that a hawk and
dove share σ = 0.5 when rookies and veterans, and both have changes in cutoffs consistent
with the signalling model: the hawk’s cutoff rises from 0.15 to 0.55 and the dove’s from
1.1 to 4.0. Nevertheless, the fall in the probability of voting high is equivalent for both
of them further highlighting the difficulty of interpreting the reduced form regressions.
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5.1 Structural estimation methodology
These problems with interpreting reduced-form evidence necessitate the use of structural
estimation in order to test the signalling model. The advantage of the structural estima-
tion is that we can estimate the evolution of both members’ cutoff and expertise. Another
advantage of structural estimation is that it allows us to conduct counterfactual analysis.
By lemma 1, policymakers vote high whenever their private signals exceed s∗it (Cit, σit, qt)
which is given by equation (2). This means that we can write the probability member i











ωt = 1, where Φ is the standard normal cdf. Using these conditional probabilities, the















To estimate the evolution of the parameters of the model—the prior qt, cutoff Cit, and
expertise σit—we need to write them as functions of observed covariates.
20 We choose






= α0 + α1 · qRt + α2 · qMt . (10)
The baseline specification for the cutoff to test empirical prediction 1 is:
ln (Cit) = β0 + β1 ·D(Vet)it + β2 ·D(NR)t + β3 ·D(Int)i + β4 ·D(Hike)t, (11)
where D(NR)t indicates whether the period t committee composition includes at least
three rookies, D(Int)i indicates whether member i is internal, and D(Hike)t indicates
whether the agenda includes at least one option to raise rates. The inclusion of D(Vet)it,
which captures the effect of tenure, and D(NR)t, which controls for the balance of the
committee between rookies and veterans, comes directly from the theoretical model. We
also include D(Int)i to control for ex-ante heterogeneity between internal and external
members; Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco (2014) show that the key observable dimension
along which MPC members vary in terms of the structural voting parameters is internal-
external. The inclusion of D(Hike)t controls for agenda-specific preferences.
21 In section
20An alternative estimation approach is to use a two-step procedure along the lines of Iaryczower and
Shum (2012) and Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco (2014). Its main disadvantage is that the mapping
between the theoretical and empirical models is less direct, but its advantage is that it can accommodate
estimation of strategic voting models. In the online appendix we use this approach to estimate both the
sincere and strategic voting models, and find the results are qualitatively identical.
21To be completely in line with the model, we could also model Cit as a function of qt, but identifying
this dependence separately from the independent effect of qt on the threshold in lemma 1 is impossible.
So our estimates of Cit for rookies should be interpreted as the average effect of signalling over different
18
6, we show that the estimates are robust to running the more parsimonious specification
excluding the additional controls.
The specification for expertise is:
ln (σit) = γ0 + γ1 ·D(Vet)it + γ2 ·D(Int)i. (12)
We include the D(Vet)it term to measure the effect of tenure, and, for similar reasons as
above, include D(Int)i in order to account for ex-ante heterogeneity between internal and
external members in terms of expertise (Hansen, McMahon, and Velasco 2014). We leave
the inclusion of D(Hike)t, which would suggest agenda-specific expertise, for a robustness
check in section 6.
Using (9)-(12) and the MPC data, we estimate the α, β, and γ parameters via max-
imum likelihood. Given that our main interest is how the cutoff and expertise evolve,
we use the estimated versions of (11) and (12) to obtain estimates of Cit and σit. In the
tables below, we report the sample average of the cutoff and expertise for rookies and
veterans separately and report bootstrapped standard errors.22
To test empirical prediction 2, we expand the specification in (11) to include one of the
member type indicators [D(θPCTExp)i or D(θ
PCTExp)i] and its interaction with D(Vet)it.
Using a similar approach, we can then recover estimates of the average C and average σ
for rookies and veterans, separately for inflation-averse and inflation-tolerant members.
5.2 Results
Table 2 shows the estimated values for the structural parameters from the baseline spec-
ification.23 The estimated member cutoffs explain the reduced-form results while also
guiding us as to their source. Consistent with the theoretical model, we find evidence of
a significant upward shift in the cutoff with experience. There is no statistically signif-
icant change in the expertise parameter. This result is of independent interest since it
suggests that members do not accumulate additional expertise with experience. Instead,
voting dynamics are driven by a shift in the average member’s cutoff in line with empirical
prediction 1.
Table 3 reports the estimated cutoffs for our two distinct measures of inflation aver-
sion. Each measure produces qualitatively identical results. All types have a significant
increase in their cutoffs, but the increase is significantly greater for more inflation-tolerant
values of qt. Also, the key predictions of signalling are independent of the value of qt.
22We use standard parametric bootstrapping. For each simulation, we plug the maximum likelihood
estimates of α, β, and γ into the likelihood function (9) and use it to draw new votes. We then re-estimate
α, β, and γ and re-recover estimates of the cutoff and expertise for rookies and veterans. We perform
1,000 such simulations, which yields a distribution from which one can compute confidence intervals in
the usual way.
23Table B.2 in appendix B reports the maximum likelihood coefficient estimates for the baseline case.
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Table 2: Baseline Estimates of Structural Parameters
Baseline
Rookie Veteran Difference
C(θ) 0.87 3.17 2.30
[0.003]
σ 0.40 0.41 0.01
[0.406]
Notes: This table shows the structural estimates for rookie and veteran members, as well
as the difference between them. We report, in brackets below the difference estimate, the
p-value of a one-sided test that the difference is significantly non-zero; the test is calculated
using a bootstrapped distribution of estimates.
members. This difference-in-differences is perhaps the strongest evidence supporting the
relevance of signalling on the MPC.
Table 3: Evolution of Cutoffs by Member Type
Inflation Averse Inflation Tolerant
Rookie Veteran Difference Rookie Veteran Difference Diff-in-Diff
D(θPCTExp) 0.33 1.58 1.26 1.52 11.22 9.69 -8.43
[0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
D(θPCT ) 0.30 0.68 0.38 2.45 18.28 15.84 -15.46
[0.048] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: This table reports the estimated cutoffs for high and low θi types based on our two
indicator measures described in the text (calculated using (i) the percentage of high votes
when a veteran and (ii) the percentage of high votes over entire tenure). The final column
compares the effect of experience on the increase in the cutoff between the two groups.
The terms reported in brackets are p-values, calculated using a bootstrapped distribution
of estimates, for a one-sided test of difference from zero.
The fact that cutoffs diverge over time suggests that veterans should be more likely
to dissent from the MPC decision than rookies. As a consistency check, table 4 presents
estimates of an OLS regression similar to equation (7) but with whether member i dissents
in meeting t as the dependent variable. Consistent with the structural results, veterans
are found to be significantly more likely to dissent. This is essentially a more formal
econometric test (e.g. with time and member fixed effects) with a longer sample of a
similar reduced-form finding in Gerlach-Kristen (2003).24
Our two empirical findings are also important because they distinguish the signalling
model from an alternative learning model in which the cutoff is a belief about some
unknown structural parameter of the macroeconomy that changes in response to new
24Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2014), and references therein, provide a more comprehensive discussion of
the literature of monetary policy dissents.
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Table 4: Reduced-form evidence on the impact of experience on dissent likelihood
(1) (2)












Model Panel LPM Panel LPM
Member effects? YES YES
Time effects? YES YES
Sample? 06/97-03/09 06/97-03/09
Obs? 1246 1246
Notes: This regression presents OLS estimates of a variant of equation (7) with standard
errors clustered by member. The difference in this regression is that the dependent vari-
able is D(Dissent)it—a dummy variable capturing whether member i dissented relative to
the committee decision in period t. We also present in column (2) the marginal effect of
each year of service (when the baseline is a member’s first year). The results show that,
controlling for member and time fixed effects, veteran members are more likely than rook-
ies to dissent from the MPC decision, and consistent with earlier regressions we find the
differential effect is strongest at the start of a member’s tenure.
data.25 We are not aware of any paper in the macro learning literature that yields the
dynamic patterns that we identify and we are skeptical that straightforward extensions
of the current generation of learning models could do so. In particular, a fairly robust
finding in the literature on learning (Kalai and Lehrer 1994) is that, as rational agents
are exposed to increasing amounts of information on a parameter, their beliefs tend to
converge even if they begin with non-common priors. The difference-in-differences finding
for the evolution of cutoffs directly contradicts this prediction. While we do not wish to
claim learning plays no role in monetary policy making, we do think the recent literature
has underplayed the idea that signalling actively influences policy decisions.
Another alternative explanation concerns a growing willingness to express views that
differ from the majority. Johnson, Ellis, and Kotenko (2012) study the policy preferences
of members of the US Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). They
find that Regional Fed Presidents adopt a more hawkish stance towards the end of their
25This literature has examined the effects of policymakers’ learning about the behavior of inflation
(Sargent 1999, Cho, Williams, and Sargent 2002, Primiceri 2006), the natural rate of unemployment
(Orphanides and Williams 2005), and potential output (Bullard and Eusepi 2005).
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tenure. They interpret this as showing that the Chair’s push for consensus simply makes
Presidents less likely to express their true preferences and they initially express the dovish
preferences of the chair. One might wonder if such early conformism is responsible for
our MPC findings but there are a number of reasons that make this explanation unlikely
as the main driver of the behavior we uncover, though such a channel may still somewhat
complement the channel explored in this paper.
First, the FOMC has a very different structure and protocols to the MPC. In par-
ticular, it has a strong norm for conforming to the Chair’s view that is explicitly absent
in the MPC. Second, contrary to what one might expect if the explanation for a change
in behavior were related to a more carefree attitude as members approached the end of
their time on the MPC, in column (3) of Table 1 we find no change in behavior as MPC
members approach the end of their terms in a similar reduced-form regression to that
in Johnson, Ellis, and Kotenko (2012). Third, we find that all MPC members change
their cutoffs over time, whereas on the FOMC only one group appears to modify their
behavior away from the Chair. In other words, the MPC does not seem to have a focal,
stable cutoff from which a certain group diverges over time.
6 Robustness
In section 2.3 we deferred the discussion of a number of theoretical simplifications. Here
we return to those simplifications while also discussing a number of empirical robustness
exercises. The tables associated with this section are contained in the online appendix.
In the model, if MPC members behaved strategically rather than sincerely, they would
condition their votes on being pivotal (i.e. changing the decision). Such behavior intro-
duces more meaningful interactions among committee members than the sincere model,
in which members essentially behave independently. The main new theoretical effect
is that rookies’ votes also signal to their colleagues as well as the public. The online
appendix describes the strategic model and its implications. We also describe how to
estimate the model under strategic voting using the two-step estimator of Iaryczower and
Shum (2012). We show that our findings are robust to the assumption of strategic voting.
Although our empirical specifications allow for differences between internal and exter-
nal members, our theory model treats all policymakers as ex-ante identical. In fact, the
model could easily be re-written to accommodate external and internal members’ types
being drawn from different distributions. Our main predictions would then hold condi-
tional on being an internal or external member: all bankers with the same appointment
status would have an increasing cutoff, with more inflation-tolerant members’ cutoffs in-
creasing more. The next section reports the results of table 2 disaggregated by internals
and externals, and shows the differences prediction is satisfied within appointment status.
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In the appendix, we report the results in table 3 separately by appointment status, and
show this stricter difference-in-differences prediction is consistent with our results.
One might also be concerned that other drivers give rise to the dynamic behavior
of MPC members. First, we consider that the behavior might be driven by members’
desire to pursue different career paths rather than anchor inflation expectations. We
check to see whether the estimated evolution of cutoffs differs depending on members’
career background as well as future career. All subgroups display a significant increase
in their estimated cutoff, suggesting our results above are not driven by any particular
group seeking out specific career goals.
We also consider whether a desire for reappointment could be driving results given that
both internals and externals can be reappointed after the end of their three-year terms
(five-years for Governor-level members). One might especially worry if reappointment
endogenously follows from more dovish interest rate choices towards the end of the first
term as this might be an alternative explanation for our empirical findings. In the online
appendix, we examine the relationship between the type proxies and reappointment, and
show that, if anything, more hawkish (internal) members are more likely to be reappointed
to serve a second term. While not conclusive evidence against any changes in behavior
driven by a desire to be reappointed, these findings at least reassure us that such effects
are not the main drivers of the dynamic behavior.
The final alternative source of dynamic behavior we consider is that members might
care about the committee’s reputation independently of their own, for example because
they care about the public’s perception of the Bank. Although veterans do not change
inflation expectations in the model, the presence of such concerns would mean that one
should treat the estimates of veterans’ cutoffs not as their true preferences, but as a
mix of preferences and the desire to protect the committee’s reputation. If this were
the case, it is likely that such concerns would have been greatest immediately following
the establishment of the MPC when there was the most uncertainty about how it would
operate. During these initial meetings, moreover, all members were, by our definition,
rookies. We therefore remove the first 18 meetings from the sample and reestimate the
structural exercise. We find that even after the MPC matured as an institution, the
predictions of our model are confirmed. Again, this does not rule out any concern about
committee reputation, but rather reinforces that it is not the main driver of our empirical
results.
As described in section 3, our two proxies for inflation aversion derive from simple
statistics of how often each member votes for high rates. We now consider some alterna-
tive measures of the member type. The first alternative measure comes from Eijffinger,
Mahieu, and Raes (2013) (EMR hereafter). They update the ideal point estimates of
MPC members using the Bayesian simulation methodology of Hix, Hoyland, and Vivyan
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(2010). These ideal points are estimates from an item response model and they measure
MPC members’ preferences for higher or lower interest rates. We rank members based
on EMR’s reported ideal points, and use the ranking to create an indicator variable
D(θEMR)i that roughly splits the sample equally.
The second measure simply uses the fixed effect estimated from equation (7). The
main advantage of this measure over our simple percentage of high votes measure is that
it controls for common drivers of voting behavior through the inclusion of time effects.
We split members into those with high and low fixed effects and define a dummy variable,
D(θFE)i, similar to the other three measures. The results in the online appendix show that
the difference-in-differences prediction is robust to all our measures of inflation aversion.
Finally, we conduct a number of checks on the robustness of the specification used
for the structural analysis. First we examine a more flexible specification for equation
(12) in which we allow the expertise to vary with the agenda by including the D(Hike)t
variable. Second, we include only the terms predicted by our model, D(Int)i and D(N
R)t,
in equation (11) and otherwise leave the baseline specification as it is. Finally, since
Mervyn King was present in all the committee meetings in the sample, and hence is not
consistent with our turnover assumption, we show that he is not driving the results by
excluding him from the sample and re-estimating the structural parameters. In all cases,
our results remain robust to the changes in the specification.
7 Signalling, Policy Rates, and Welfare
Given the structural estimates, we can quantify the effect of signalling on policy. First, by
proposition 2, the structural estimates of cutoffs for veterans are the same ones veterans
would use without signalling. Furthermore, by proposition 1, rookies would also use
these cutoffs without signalling. So, to assess the effect of signalling, one can compare
rates chosen by a signalling committee in which rookies and veterans use the cutoffs we
estimate (CSit) with those chosen by a non-signalling committee in which both rookie and
veteran members adopt veteran cutoffs (CNSit ).
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Our counterfactual exercise uses a committee of five internal and four external mem-
bers to match the structure of the MPC. In odd (even) periods there are three (two) rookie
internals, three (one) rookie externals, two (three) veteran internals, and one (three) vet-
eran externals.27 In order to mimic the actual MPC, we need to allow for cutoffs and
expertise to vary across internals and externals, whose behavior several studies have found
to differ. Table 5 reports the estimated structural parameters from the baseline specifica-
26If concerns for the reputation of the committee also affect behavior (see section 2.3), then this exercise
will understate the effect of signalling on policy.
27The exact composition of rookies and veterans in odd and ever periods does not greatly affect the
results. We choose this composition since it matches the D(NR)t control used in (11).
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tion separately for internal and external members. In line with Hansen, McMahon, and
Velasco (2014), internal members have greater expertise and are more inflation averse.
Also, the external cutoff shifts more than the internal cutoff, which is consistent with
the difference-in-differences prediction. But ex ante heterogeneity might also explain this
result. For example, there may be less uncertainty about internals’ types, reducing their
incentive to signal.
Table 5: Structural Parameters for Internals and Externals
Internal External
Rookie Veteran Difference Rookie Veteran Difference Diff-in-Diff
C(θ) 0.17 0.78 0.61 1.42 7.18 5.76 -5.14
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
σ 0.30 0.33 0.04 0.48 0.54 0.06 -0.02
[0.055] [0.055] [0.055]
Notes: This table replicates table 2 for internal and external members separately (see
that table for details). The final column compares the effect of experience between the
two groups for the cutoff C, as well as the precision parameter σ. The terms reported
in brackets are p-values, calculated using a bootstrapped distribution of estimates, for a
one-sided test of difference from zero.
The other estimated object important for the counterfactual exercise is the distribu-
tion of qt. When the prior is extreme, one would expect the impact of signalling on policy
to be small since everyone has a clear view on the right decision. However, when the prior
is nearer to 0.5, there is more uncertainty and signalling should play a larger role. The
structural model produces 137 different estimates of qt, one for each meeting for which
we have qRt and q
M
t data. These are roughly uniform on the [0, 1] interval.
We consider the behavior of the committee over 5 years, or 60 meetings. For each
period t = 1, . . . , 60, we generate two policy choices—rSt for the signalling (actual) com-
mittee and rNSt for the non-signalling (counterfactual) committee—using the following
procedure:
1. Draw qt from one of the 137 fitted values (with replacement).
2. Draw ωt given qt.
3. Draw a signal for each member from N (ωt, σ2it).
4. Draw a vote for each member using member-specific parameters:28
(a) For the actual committee (S), vit = 1⇔ sit ≥ s∗it
(
CSit , σit, qt
)
.
(b) For the counterfactual committee (NS), vit = 1⇔ sit ≥ s∗it
(
CNSit , σit, qt
)
.
28To be clear, CSit and σit take on any of the four estimated values in table 5 depending on whether i
is internal or external and whether he is a rookie or veteran in period t. By contrast, CNSit only takes
on two values, the estimated veteran cutoffs for internals or externals.
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5. Compute rSt and r
NS
t by majority rule given individual votes.
Since s∗it
(
CNSit , σit, qt
) ≥ s∗it (CSit , σit, qt), a member who votes for low rates when signalling
will never vote for high rates when not. So it is either the case that rSt = r
NS
t , or that
rSt = 1 > 0 = r
NS
t and we can measure the overall effect of signalling, over a given horizon,
as the number of times the actual committee chooses a high rate while the counterfactual
committee chooses a low one. One can express this impact in basis point terms by
multiplying the number of rate differences by the standard interest rate increment, 25.
As the votes depend on draws of signals for each member, a policy rate path derived
from this exercise is a single draw of a random variable, and the ultimate objects of interest
are the distributions of interest rate paths. We simulate these by drawing 10,000 different
signalling and non-signalling paths. In the first three rows of table 6 we report cumulative
probabilities of differences in the interest rate paths. In a twelve-month period, signalling
induces a 25bps difference with probability 0.41. After 36 months this probability grows
to 0.80 and after 60 months to 0.93. Larger effects also have large probabilities. The
odds are nearly even that signalling generates a 50bps difference after 36 months and a
75bps difference after 60 months. Given that, according to Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and
Tong (2011), the Bank of England’s QE program reduced yields on five- to 25-year gilts
by around 100bps on average, the effects we estimate are economically substantial.29
Table 6: Counterfactual analysis comparing a signalling and non-signalling committee
After X Months
12 24 36 48 60
Pr(At least 25bps extra cut) 0.41 0.66 0.80 0.88 0.93
Pr(At least 50bps extra cut) 0.09 0.28 0.46 0.63 0.74
Pr(At least 75bps extra cut) 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.49
Mean Errors (Signalling Committee) 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 4.0
Mean Errors (Non-Signalling Committee) 1.2 2.5 3.8 5.1 6.3
Pr(Fewer errors) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Pr(Equal errors) 0.63 0.38 0.23 0.14 0.09
Pr(More errors) 0.35 0.61 0.76 0.85 0.90
Notes: The upper panel of this table summarises the distribution of differences between the
signalling and non-signalling interest rate paths from 10,000 simulations of committee be-
havior. The lower panel shows the mean number of errors made on each committee, as well
as well various cummulative probabilities of the differences between the two committees.
Perhaps an even more important economic question is the effect of signalling on wel-
fare. As discussed in section 3.1, the Bank of England treats upside and downside misses
29Given the nature of the counterfactual exercise, the difference between the two committees would
continue to grow with longer time horizons. Interpreting effects at horizons longer than a business cycle
are problematic, however, because variables treated as exogenous like the agenda and the distribution of
qt would begin to differ in economies whose interest rates diverged by as much as 100bps.
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equally, so we can assess welfare by comparing whether the actual or counterfactual
paths generate more errors. Signalling can both help welfare (by inducing high rates
when ωt = 1) and hurt it (by doing so when ωt = 0). Nevertheless, we find that signalling
clearly improves welfare on average. Moreover, the probability that the non-signalling
committee makes fewer errors is consistently around 1%. But once the time horizon
reaches two years, the signalling committee has a greater than 60% probability of per-
forming strictly better and by five years this is 90%.
Signalling creates a benefit since dovish externals behave more neutrally when rookies,
but also a cost since already hawkish internals behave even more hawkishly. Why then
does signalling improve welfare? The effect of the cutoff on voting behavior declines with
expertise: a member with a very low value of σ simply follows his very precise signal
and disregards the cutoff.30 Since internals are more expert than externals, the beneficial
effect of signalling on externals’ cutoffs is more relevant for welfare than the detrimental
effect on internals’.
8 Conclusion
This paper argues that one should take seriously the idea that independent monetary
policy makers care about their reputation for inflation aversion. It does so by building a
new model of signalling in monetary policy with two predictions on dynamic behavior that
can be tested with structural estimation. Although the Bank of England is admired for
its independence, the voting behavior of its MPC members fits very well a model in which
preferences are heterogeneous and establishing credibility is crucial. This suggests that
independent central banks do not automatically replicate the policies of the metaphorical
“hard-nosed” banker often invoked to discuss the behavior of central banks.
Beyond showing that signalling is important for explaining voting behavior, the pa-
per’s welfare results have clear implications for committee design, and particularly those
features which can affect the incentive to signal. Since signalling appears to affect behav-
ior most at the beginning of tenure and fade over time, our results provide a rationale for
regular committee member turnover to generate uncertainty on policymakers’ types and
maintain the strength of the signalling incentive. Second, more subtly, the cutoffs in table
5 suggest that reappointing internal members and replacing external ones might domi-
nate replacing the whole committee.31 Finally, to the extent that individual signalling
30As one can see from lemma 1, as σ → 0 the threshold that the signal must cross to vote high
converges to 12 , which is independent of the cutoff C.
31We cannot simply run a counterfactual with this alternative committee structure and the cutoffs in
table 5 because the equilibrium strength of the signalling incentive for external members will not be the
same as in the committee with rookie internals. Quantifying this difference would require estimates of
additional model parameters.
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incentives are positively related to the public’s ability to observe policymakers’ choices
(as in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Faust and Svensson (2001), and Sibert (2009)), the
results support a transparent regime (in line with Bank of England policy) in which the
public can directly observe individual votes as opposed to just the committee decision.
Of course, our conclusions are based on the voting behavior of the MPC, so one might
wonder the extent to which they are externally valid. An initial point is that numerous
other central banks, such as the Swedish Riksbank, have very similar institutional frame-
works that combine a committee of experts with an inflation target. Nevertheless, it is
important to consider how the particular structure of the MPC might affect the results.
First, the MPC has nine members. In countries with smaller (larger) committees,
one would expect signalling to have a stronger (weaker) effect on on voting behavior. A
rational public changes its inflation expectations after observing a single member vote
high depending on whether that member will affect future policy. Since members are more
likely to change policy on smaller committees, the reaction of expectations to individual
votes should be correspondingly higher.
Second, the MPC has an inflation target, which should partially solve the credibility
problem and provide some discipline for its members to be tough on inflation. For ex-
ample, Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) find evidence that UK monetary policy makers
became less inflation tolerant (a lower θi in our model) after the adoption of an inflation
target. In central banks with greater policy discretion, time consistency problems might
be more serious and signalling may be more important.
Third, the MPC encourages members to vote for their preferred policies even if these
contradict the Chair’s. Thus, individual votes can be taken as informative signals of true
preferences. In committees in which the Chair plays a more dominant role, like the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), members typically do not dissent in vote against the
Chair’s proposal, making it much more difficult for the public to infer preferences based
on voting records. In this case, other signals, such as member speeches, may be more
important communication channels.
Ultimately the impact of different characteristics of institutional design on signalling
incentives is an empirical question which we leave for future research.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1









































































A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. A veteran’s expected utility of choosing vit is
U(vit, θi) = ω̂it {−l [pi(vit, 1)] + θipi(vit, 1)}+ (1− ω̂it) {−l [pi(vit, 0)] + θipi(vit, 0)} − θipiEt .
U(1, θi) ≥ U(0, θi) is equivalent to using a cutoff voting rule with cutoff CNS(θi). Moreover,
since piEt+1 is independent of observed period t votes, rookies face the identical utility maximiza-
tion problem as veterans.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. As explained in the text, a veteran in the signalling model adopts the same voting rule
as with no signalling, so we focus on the equilibrium behavior of rookies. Their expected utility
of choosing vit is
















from which one derives the cutoff in (5).







) ≡ s∗ [CSR (θ, qt, NRt ) , σR, qt] and s∗V (θ) ≡ s∗ [CSV (θ) , σV , qt]
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as the equilibrium thresholds adopted by rookies and veterans.32 Also define





∣∣ s∗R (θ, qt+1, NRt+1) , s∗V (θ) , ωt+1 ] ∣∣ pt+1 },
One can then express piE∗(It+1) as
qt+1 {pi(1, 1) + [pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1)]H(1, It+1)}+(1−qt+1) {pi(1, 0) + [pi(0, 0)− pi(1, 0)]H(0, It+1)} .
Note that the conditional probability inside the expectation inH(ωt+1, It+1) is strictly increasing
in any veteran’s type since the probability any veteran i votes vit = 0 is increasing in s
∗
V , which
is itself increasing in θi.
The main proof proceeds in three steps. First, assumption A3 implies [pi(0, ωt)−pi(1, ωt)]−
δ∆(qt, N
R
t | ωt) > 0 ∀ωt by guaranteeing that pi(0, 0)− pi(1, 0) > δ∆ and pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1) > δ∆,
where ∆ = q[pi(0, 1) − pi(1, 1)] + (1 − q)[pi(0, 0) − pi(1, 0)] is an upper bound on the change in
period t+ 1 inflation expectations from observing an additional high vote by rookies.
Second, in every equilibrium ∆(· | ωt) ≥ 0. Let pθ0 be the prior probability attached to a




1− Φ [(s∗R (θ, qt, NRt )− ωt) /σR]}vR Φ [(s∗R (θ, qt, NRt )− ωt) /σR]1−vR pθ0∑
θ
[
1− Φ [(s∗R (θ, qt, NRt )− ωt) /σR]]vR Φ [(s∗R (θ, qt, NRt )− ωt) /σR]1−vR pθ0 ,










1− Φ [(s∗R (θ, qt, NRt )− ωt) /σR] ,
which is monotonically increasing in θ. Since H(ωt+1) is also monotonically increasing in mem-


























Third, we must show an equilibrium exists. Since NRt only depends on whether t is an
odd or even period, this is a solution to a system of 2K equations. Let CSR0(θ, qt) [C
S
R1(θ, qt)]
be the K equilibrium cutoffs used in even (odd) periods. Moreover, let ∆0(qt, N0 | ωt) and
∆1(qt, N1 | ωt) be the equilibrium strengths of the signalling incentive in even and odd periods,
respectively. These each depend continuously on both sets of cutoffs CSR0(θ, qt) and C
S
R1(θ, qt).
The equilibrium system is then
CSRj(θ, qt) =
µ0 + θ {[pi(0, 0)− pi(1, 0)]− δ∆j(qt, Nj | 0)}
µ1 − θ {[pi(0, 1)− pi(1, 1)]− δ∆j(qt, Nj | 1)}
32Here we drop the i index in the arguments of the equilibrium thresholds because rookies and veterans
are assumed to use symmetric strategies.
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for θ = θ, . . . , θ and j = 0, 1. By the arguments above, the right-hand side of this system maps
CL ≤ CSRj(θ, qt) ≤ . . . ≤ CSRj(θ, qt) ≤ CH for j = 0, 1
into itself, where CL =
µ0+θ{[pi(0,0)−pi(1,0)]−δ∆}
µ1−θ{[pi(0,1)−pi(1,1)]−δ∆} and CH =
µ0+θ[pi(0,0)−pi(1,0)]
µ1−θ[pi(0,1)−pi(1,1)] . Hence the condi-
tions of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem are met, and a solution to the system exists.
It remains to be shown that CSV (θ)− CSRj(θ, qt) is increasing in θ. Letting aωt ≡ pi(0, ωt)−
pi(1, ωt) and b
j




a0[µ1 − θa1] + a1[µ0 + θa0]






[a0 − bj0(qt)][µ1 − θa1 + θbj1(qt)] + [a1 − bj1(qt)][µ0 + θa0 − θbj0(qt)]
[µ1 − θa1 + θbj1(qt)]2
=
[a0 − bj0(qt)]µ1 + [a1 − bj1(qt)]µ0
[µ1 − θa1 + θbj1(qt)]2






B Appendix Data Tables
Table B.1: MPC Members in the Sample
First Last Total % as
Member D(Int)i Meeting Meeting Meetings Veteran D(θ
PCT )i D(θ
PCTExp)i
Davies Internal Jun 1997 Jul 1997 2 0.0 0
George Internal Jun 1997 Jun 2003 73 75.3 0 0
King Internal Jun 1997 142 87.3 0 0
Plenderleith Internal Jun 1997 May 2002 60 70.0 1 0
Clementi Internal Sep 1997 Aug 2002 60 70.0 1 0
Vickers Internal Jun 1998 Sep 2000 28 35.7 0 1
Bean Internal Oct 2000 102 82.4 1 0
Tucker Internal Jun 2002 82 78.0 0 0
Large Internal Oct 2002 Jan 2006 40 55.0 0 0
Lomax Internal Jul 2003 Jun 2008 60 70.0 1 0
Gieve Internal Feb 2006 Feb 2009 37 51.4 1 1
Dale Internal Jul 2008 9 0.0 1
Fisher Internal Mar 2009 1 0.0 0
Buiter External Jun 1997 May 2000 36 50.0 1 1
Goodhart External Jun 1997 May 2000 36 50.0 0 1
Julius External Sep 1997 May 2001 45 60.0 1 0
Budd External Dec 1997 May 1999 18 0.0 0
Wadhwani External Jun 1999 May 2002 36 50.0 1 1
Allsop External Jun 2000 May 2003 36 50.0 1 0
Nickell External Jun 2000 May 2006 72 75.0 1 0
Barker External Jun 2001 94 80.9 0 1
Bell External Jul 2002 Jun 2005 36 50.0 1 1
Lambert External Jun 2003 Mar 2006 34 47.1 1 0
Walton External Jul 2005 Jun 2006 12 0.0 0
Blanchflower External Jun 2006 34 47.1 1 0
Besley External Sep 2006 31 41.9 0 1
Sentence External Oct 2006 30 40.0 0 0
Notes: This table provides summary statistics concerning the MPC members in our sample.
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Table B.2: MLE Estimates for the Baseline Model



















Constant -2.99*** 1.22*** -0.72***
[0.000] [0.009] [0.000]
Notes: This table provides maximum likelihood estimates of (10), (11) and (12) to maximize
the likelihood (9). P-values are reported in the brackets below the estimated coefficient.
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